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Abstract
This article assesses the impact of dentist remuneration on the
incidence of potentially harmful dental x-rays. We use unique panel
data which provide details of 1.3 million treatment claims by Scot-
tish NHS dentists made between 1998 and 2007. Controlling for un-
observed heterogeneity of both patients and dentists we estimate a
series of fixed-effects models that are informed by a theoretical model
of x-ray delivery and identify the effects on dental x-raying of den-
tists moving from a fixed salary to fee-for-service and patients moving
from co-payment to exemption. We establish that there are signif-
icant increases in x-rays when dentists receive fee-for-service rather
than salary payments and when patients are made exempt from pay-
ment.
JEL Code I11. Keywords: Healthcare, incentives, matched data, den-
tistry.
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1 Introduction
“In 1992, shortly after Gerd Gigerenzer1 moved to Chicago, he
took his six-year-old daughter to the dentist. She didn’t have
toothache, but he thought it was about time she got acquainted
with the routine of sitting in the big reclining chair and being
prodded with pointy objects. The clinic had other ideas. ‘The
dentist wanted to x-ray her,’ Gigerenzer recalls. ‘I told first the
nurse, and then him, that she had no pains and I wanted him to
do a clinical examination, not an x-ray.’ ”
Dental x-rays are one of the most common sources of x-ray exposure.
Whilst they are an important diagnostic tool, x-rays are a known human
carcinogen and there is no threshold below which exposure is considered
totally safe. So clinical guidance indicates that x-rays should only be under-
taken if the clinical benefits to the patient warrant the risk. The financial
arrangements of the physician or their patient should not come into play. In
this article we examine the extent to which, notwithstanding that clinical
imperative, they actually do. Specifically we estimate the effect of a dentist
changing from a fee-for-service to a salaried arrangement on the probability
that they x-ray a patient over the course of treatment and of the effect of a
patient changing from co-payment to full exemption on that same probability.
Health economists have long posited that financial incentives matter and
have constructed and tested models of the impact of different financial ar-
rangements on numerous aspects of medical treatment. The idea that insu-
lating patients from the costs of treatment might induce excessive treatment
has a very long heritage (see, for example Zweifel and Manning, 2000) whilst
physician remuneration viewed in the context of agency relationships as de-
scribed in McGuire (2000) suggests that fee-for-service payment may induce
more treatment. This aspect of fee-for-service has led to calls for its phasing
out (Schroeder and Frist, 2013). As with the majority of studies the recent
contribution by Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) finds very little effect of excess
treatment on patient well-being. Many treatments – routine examinations
and investigations – do not pose health risks for patients so whilst extra
treatment induced by fee-for-service may result in waste, it might be benign
1Gerd Gigerenzer is director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy in Berlin and this
quotation appeared in a British Broadcasting Corporation internet article commenting on
attitudes of physicians to risk; see, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28166019
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in regard to health. This cannot be said for x-rays and ours is the first study
to bring the interpretative lens of the economics of incentives and empirical
evidence onto this potentially harmful treatment.
Ionizing radiation can directly induce cell death but the low doses used in
dental imaging are more likely to induce DNA damage and can result in can-
cer and leukaemia (Little, 2003). A widely accepted concept in this context
is the linear non-threshold hypothesis which postulates that the likelihood
of developing cancer increases linearly with radiation dose and that there is
no threshold level of radiation exposure below which carcinogenesis does not
occur (Kellerer, 2000). Empirical evidence about the impact of low radiation
doses, such as those caused by dental x-rays, on carcinogenesis is relatively
sparse due to sample sizes which often are too small for detecting significant
relations (White and Mallya, 2012). However, some studies, such as Memon
et al (2010) and Preston-Martin and White (1990), suggest that dental imag-
ing is specifically associated with meningiomas, salivary gland tumours and
thyroid tumours. A recent population-based case-control retrospective study
by Claus et al (2012) found that patients with meningioma have twice the
likelihood of reporting having ever had a bitewing examination than patients
without meningioma. This and similar evidence about potential risks of x-
raying substantiates the recommendation of the International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) that activities that cause exposure to ra-
diation can only be justified if they do more good than harm (ICRP, 2008)
for the patient. In this context evidence that the remuneration of a den-
tist positively impacts on the decision to carry out an x-ray examination is
concerning since such remuneration is not a clinical benefit to the patient.
To examine whether, contrary to clinical guidance, x-ray use responds
to financial arrangements we make use of an extensive and detailed dataset
concerning the incidence of x-ray imaging in dental treatment in the NHS
in Scotland. Our data follow patients and dentists over multiple treatment
episodes for 10 years and thus track changes in the use of x-rays associated
with changes in a dentist’s method of reimbursement whilst also permitting
us to control for changes in a particular patient’s circumstance, including
whether or not they contribute to the cost of their treatment, and to account
for time invariant unobserved patient and dentist characteristics. We inter-
pret these data in the context of a model of interactions between physician
and patient and their respective financial arrangements. Our results indicate
that a dentist’s reimbursement method induces a significant impact on x-ray
use with dentists who are paid a separate fee for each x-ray providing more
3
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x-rays. This effect is greater if the patient is also exempt from payment. We
also find an effect ceteris paribus of a patient being made exempt and again
the effect is to increase the number of x-rays they receive and to a greater
extent if the dentist is paid fee-for-service. Whilst our findings cannot es-
tablish whether harm is done by the prevalence of dental x-rays in our study
population, they do establish that financial incentives are not consistent with
the avoidance of harm. Furthermore they establish that harm is significantly
more likely when a dentist is paid under fee-for-service (relative to salary)
and their patient is exempt from charges. Based on these results, current
regulatory arrangements for reducing the potential risks of dental imaging
may be insufficient, whilst proposals to modify the remuneration of dentists
or patient charges need to be mindful of the potential impact on x-ray use
of these financial incentives, both individually and jointly.
Previous empirical evidence regarding the effect of dentists’ financial in-
centives is limited. Findings by Birch (1988) suggest that there are incen-
tives for over-treatment for dentists receiving fee-for-service payments in the
British NHS. Similarly, Chalkley et al (2010), Chalkley and Tilley (2006)
and Listl and Chalkley (2014) have investigated the effects of different den-
tists’ reimbursement schemes in Scotland focusing respectively on intensity of
treatment and prevalence of check-ups. Whittaker and Birch (2012) investi-
gate how access to treatment varies according to a change in reimbursement
mechanisms. In agreement with studies from other areas of medical prac-
tice these show that dentists receiving fee-for-service payments treat patients
more intensively than their salaried counterparts. For Norway, Grytten et
al (2009) also find that “the transition to an incentive-based remuneration
system led to an increase in the number of individuals under supervision,
without either a fall in quality or a patient selection effect”. Whilst all of
these studies provide evidence of the effect of financial incentives on various
measures of dental treatment none are able to focus on a potentially harmful
treatment. Some support for potentially harmful effects of excessive dental
treatment is provided by McDonald et al (2012) but their study does not
access individual longitudinal data of the kind we consider, cannot identify
a specific treatment item and cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity.
Establishing a causal linkage between financial arrangements and treat-
ment requires not only detailed data permitting identification but also a
plausible causal mechanism. To establish the latter, in Section 2 we set out
a theoretical framework that is conducive to understanding the interaction
between a dentist and their patient and the consequences of that interaction
4
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for the probability of observing an x-ray examination. Understanding our
data necessitates a description of the institutional arrangements that gener-
ate them and we describe these arrangements in Section 3. We then describe
our data and our empirical strategy for examining the relationship between
dentist remuneration and the incidence of x-ray examinations. We present
and describe our key findings in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
We adopt a framework in the spirit of Dranove (1988) which places em-
phasis on the interaction between a physician, in our case a dentist, and their
patient. We model an x-ray examination that takes place depending on the
physician being prepared to supply and the patient being prepared to accept.
In what follows we assume that the dentist is a monopoly supplier at
the point of treatment2 and the only treatment decision under direct con-
sideration is whether to undertake an x-ray examination3. We allow for
heterogeneity across patients captured by i ∈ [I, I] distributed with den-
sity f(i) and heterogeneity across dentists captured by j ∈ [J, J ] distributed
with density g(j). Before presenting for treatment we assume the patient re-
ceives a random drawing determining their state of dental health, Z ∈ [0, Z]
from a distribution of health states φ(Z), which reflects all of the relevant
information to inform a treatment decision; we normalise such that Z = 0
corresponds to a patient who exhibits no symptoms indicating the need for
an x-ray. Both dentist and patient know Z for each interaction. Finally, we
assume that the the expected health impact of an x-ray on patient i with
state Z as evaluated by dentist j is given by h(Z, i, j) which is increasing in
Z, but may be negative if the x-ray will produce little useful information. In
the publicly funded health system we study the health impacts of treatments
reflected in h are usually measured in terms of QALYs.
2One justification for this assumption could be that patients will likely have a pref-
erence for repeated interactions with one trusted dentist rather than switching between
various dentists.
3The extension to consider subsequent treatment and the potential value of an x-ray
in informing that treatment is discussed in Section 2.3.
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2.1 Avoiding harm
An important feature of x-rays is the potential to cause harm. Thus whilst
h(Z, i, j) may be negative the principle of “first do no harm” implies that no
x-ray should be undertaken when that is the case. This also accords with the
optimal choice of x-rays in a health care system for which the objective is to
maximise patient health for a given budget. If the total cost4 of delivering
an x-ray is c, and the opportunity cost of funds (the health gain that would
be lost if an extra unit of expenditure is devoted to an x-ray) is δ then the
delivery of an x-ray should satisfy a cost-effectiveness threshold; h(Z, i, j) ≥
δc.
An alternative formulation of this policy is to note that conditional upon
a realisation of i and j it specifies a health-state threshold such that an x-ray
should only be undertaken if the patient’s health state exceeds a critical value.
Specifically if Z∗ satisfies h(Z∗, i, j) = δc > 0 then an x-ray should only be
undertaken if Z > Z∗(i, j) which indicates that the decision is independent
of any financial payments to (or from) the dentist (patient). Denoting an
indicator of when an x-ray will occur by Iah, then the avoidance of harm
requires that
Iah(Z, i, j) = 1 if Z ≥ Z
∗(i, j)
= 0 otherwise,
(1)
and this can be used to determine the probability that an x-ray will be
observed in an encounter between a patient of type i and a dentist of type j,
denoted Pah(i, j) as:
(2) Pah(i, j) =
∫
∞
0
I(Z, i, j)f(Z)dZ.
Equation (2) indicates that the avoidance of harm requires that the prob-
ability of an x-ray being taken can depend on the characteristics of both the
patient and dentist and the patient’s health state but not on the financial
status of the patient or the method of remunerating the dentist.
4This cost includes the value of all resources used to conduct an x-ray and thus the
value of the dentist’s time.
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2.2 Dentist-patient interactions
The conduct of an x-ray can only occur if both parties are willing and
the prevailing financial system can be expected to affect that willingness.
To examine this issue further we consider the dentist’s and the patient’s
assessments of the value of an x-ray and where these differ we allow for
the dentist to expend effort to persuade the patient of its worth. We then
consider what decision rule for determining when to x-ray will result – and
upon what it will depend.
We assume that a patient of type i derives utility from their expectation
of the health impact from having an x-ray conditional on their health state,
denoted H(Z, i), and their wealth W adjusted for any financial implications
of treatment. We denote by e the effort that the dentist expends in convincing
the patient and for convenience we denominate effort in money equivalent
terms. We assume that the patient pays a price of p for the x-ray and
therefore5 write
Up(Z, i, p,W, e) = u(H(Z, i)),W − p+ e), if an x-ray is received
= u(0,W ) otherwise.
(3)
The dentist derives utility from the health gain6 consequent on carrying
out an x-ray and from any financial surplus or deficit that results. The dentist
bears a cost C in conducting an x-ray, receives a transfer T (which may be
zero, less or more than C) and expends effort e. We write their utility as an
increasing function v of the patient’s health impact and their own financial
reward and summarise this in the function V , written as
V d(Z, i, j, T, C, e) = v(h(Z, i, j), T − C − e) if an x-ray is given
= 0 otherwise.
(4)
Since the dentist observes the patient’s condition Z and type i they can
determine how much effort would be required to persuade the patient to
undergo an x-ray. Denoting the effort required to just persuade the patient
5If the patient anticipates further treatment in the absence of an x-ray the term fol-
lowing the second equals sign can be replaced with u(H(, Z, i),W − p), where underscore
indicates the relevant values in the absence of an x-ray.
6Hence, in this formulation the dentist is altruistic in being concerned about the pa-
tient’s health status.
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to undergo treatment by e˜, this satisfies
(5) u(H(Z, i)),W − p+ e˜)− u(0,W ) = 0
and on the condition that effort is non-negative the minimum effort required
to be input by the dentist is given by
(6) em(i, Z, p) = max[0, e˜(i, Z, p)].
Since by assumption H is increasing in Z then e˜ in (5) is decreasing in Z
and hence em is decreasing in Z. Given this minimum effort the dentist
will determine whether it is worthwhile doing an x-ray according to whether
v(h(Z, i, j), T − C − em(i, Z, p)) is positive in which case they will expend
effort em(i, Z) and carry out the x-ray. Otherwise no x-ray will be given and
the patient is either sent away, or other treatment items are undertaken.7
This approach again defines a critical cut-off health state Z for an x-ray
being given but the cutoff will depend on i, j, p, C and T . Hence we define
Z˜(i, j, T, p, c) such that:
(7) v(h(Z˜, i, j), T − C − em(i, Z˜, p)) = 0.
As previously established, em is decreasing in Z whilst by assumption v is
increasing in h and T − C − em(i, Z˜, p) and hence Z˜ is decreasing in T and
increasing in p. In contrast with the decision rule required implying no harm
(given by Z∗) the propensity to x-ray responds to financial incentives and
there exist values of T for which some patient - dentist interactions can result
in harm. Using an indicator of when an x-ray will occur of Idp, this satisfies
Idp(Z, i, j, T, p, C) = 1 if Z ≥ Z˜(i, j, T, p, C)
= 0 otherwise,
(8)
7The model set out here also accords with the approach adopted by Chandra, Cutler
and Song (2012) which views the quantity of treatment being observed as the minimum of
the doctor’s (supply) and patient’s (demand) choices. We differ in allowing for a doctor to
transfer resources to the patient (effort) in order to convince them of the efficacy of their
chosen treatment. We view such a transfer as inherent in the patient-physician interaction,
whereas side-payments from the patient to their physician to induce higher than medically
advised treatment would run foul of medical ethics.
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and this can be used to determine the probability of observing an x-ray in
an encounter between a patient of type i and a dentist of type j, denoted
Pdp(i, j) as:
(9) Pdp(i, j) =
∫
∞
0
Idp(Z, i, j, T, p, c)f(Z)dZ.
As previously established Z˜ is decreasing in T and increasing in p so the
model indicates that the probability that an x-ray occurring is greater if the
dentist is paid more or the patient is charged less.
2.3 Interpretation and generalisation
The model suggests that the probability that an x-ray is observed in any
particular patient-dentist encounter will depend on the characteristics (the
types j and i) of dentist and patient, the dentist’s remuneration, the extent to
which the patient pays and the patient’s dental health state at the time of the
interaction. When, as described subsequently we observe characteristics of
the dentist and patient that relate to their respective types and the patient’s
dental health state, it is natural to use these as explanatory variables for
the observation of an x-ray examination. No set of observable variables will
completely capture patients’ and dentists’ types but repeated observations
of given individuals can be used to control for any time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity. We operationalise this model by estimating a linear proba-
bility empirical analogue of equation (9) in which a dentist changing from
fee-for-service to salary corresponds to T being reduced to zero, and a pa-
tient moving from co-payment to exemption corresponds to p being reduced
to zero.
The key purposes of the model are to motivate the empirical estimation
of the impact of financial variables on the incidence of x-rays and to indicate
that the imperative of doing no harm suggests that those financial variables
should not be relevant. Hence, finding statistically significant effects of a
dentist’s remuneration or their patient’s exemption status is a cause for con-
cern.
Whilst the model is stylised its implications regarding the likely impact
of financial variables on the incidence of x-rays will survive a number of
extensions and generalisations.
In practice the patient will undergo further treatment whether or not they
9
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have an x-ray and the framework set out can accommodate this possibility
in which x-rays are informative of a patients treatment requirements. In
such a setting h(Z, i, j) can be interpreted as the expected health gain to a
patient conditional on their receiving an x-ray and is the difference between
the health gain that would follow from treatment informed by an x-ray and
the health gain from treatment determined solely on the basis of a visual
examination. In this setting the transfer T to the dentist can be interpreted
as the payment the dentist receives for the x-ray plus any surplus between
what they receive for subsequent treatment and what that treatment costs to
deliver. In equation (4) the second equality can be replaced with T and would
reflect the surplus of revenue over cost of any treatment carried out without
the information derived from an x-ray. The subsequent analysis is not altered,
save for the additional term T appearing in the expressions for Z˜. In terms of
further treatment, where the same treatment and health impact would occur
irrespective of the result of the x-ray, then by definition h(Z, i, j) < 0. Thus a
necessary condition for not causing harm is that subsequent treatment should
depend on the outcome of the x-ray. If, for example, monitoring by means
of visual-tactile inspection or periodontal probing is the preferred treatment
an x-ray should not be given.
We have considered dentists to be altruistic, in the sense of taking account
of the health impact of carrying out an x-ray. Whilst that has been allowed
to be an individual dentist’s assessment it could correspond exactly to an
objective measure of health impact but the key implications of the model
would persist, in that as long as the dentist is at all concerned (derives
utility from) their financial payment their decision of whether to x-ray will
depend upon that. In our data we observe whether a patient is visiting a
particular dentist for the first time, i.e. whether they have visited a different
dentist previously. Whilst not formally modelled here, it is plausible that
such switching is correlated with i and j, so that patients who have more (or
less) pressing dental problems seek out a more (or less) treatment focused
dentist. It is also possible that the cost a dentist incurs in convincing a
patient of the value of treatment depends on the long term relationship that
they have developed. Hence, the model gives some insight into why patients
that are new to a particular dentist may be more or less likely to receive
x-rays.
10
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3 Empirical framework
3.1 Institutional background
Primary dental care in Scotland is provided by both the public and private
sectors. The majority of public sector primary dental care is provided by the
General Dental Service (GDS). The reimbursement of GDS dentists takes two
different forms. Non-salaried GDS dentists are self-employed and are paid
under a mixed system consisting of capitation and fee-for-service elements.
They receive a fixed payment for every person registered with them and a
fee for every treatment procedure performed (Scottish Dental Practice Board,
2001). Salaried GDS dentists are employed by the public sector and as such
receive a salary independent of the actual treatments they perform. The
exact arrangements of GDS reimbursement are constituted in the Statement
of Dental Remuneration which is described in Scottish Dental Practice Board
(2001). These arrangements persisted over our study period as unlike in
England there was no new dental contract introduced in 2006. Dentists can
also provide treatment to privately paying patients. Our data do not enable
us to determine potential spillover effects between the private and NHS dental
services. For example, non-salaried NHS dentists might also privately provide
x-rays to patients, particularly if this yields higher reimbursement rates than
provision of x-rays according to the NHS fees scheme. In this sense, the
findings of our study might be considered lower bound estimates of the impact
of financial incentives because private provision of dental services (outside the
NHS) is arguably most likely to occur if a dentist is paid fee-for-service and
the patient is exempt from treatment charges.
Patients who are treated by the GDS may be exempt from paying any
charges for one of several reasons8 or non-exempt in which case they pay 80%
of the treatment fee up to a limit9.
3.2 Dataset and variables
The data used for our study originate from the Management Information
and Dental Accounting System (MIDAS). This database includes claims by
8These include being below below 18 years of age, being in full-time education if aged
19, receiving income support, receiving family credit, receiving income based jobseekers
allowance, pregnancy and being a nursing mother (Scottish Dental Practice Board, 2001)
9This limit was £278 in 2004.
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GDS dentists. Our dataset is a 5% random sample of treatment claims made
between January 1998 and September 2007. For reasons of data protec-
tion, sampling was on the basis of claims rather than patients. Whilst our
sample does not include complete treatment histories for all patients, it nev-
ertheless contains multiple treatment episodes for many patients both within
and across dentists. The sample was created by extracting claims made by
salaried dentists and non-salaried self-employed dentists. In total, our sample
contains 1,300,665 treatment claims made by Scottish GDPs. Because there
are specific arrangements for treatment as a consequence of dental trauma
(accidents) and for persons aged 18 years or below, these claims are not con-
sidered for the purposes of this article so the resulting number of observations
we analyse comprises 1,294,012 treatment claims, covering 200,326 separate
patients and 3,144 separate dentists. The database provides the advantage
of following individual patients and dentists continuously and these panel
characteristics enable us to examine the impact on the utilization of x-rays
of changes in a patient’s exemption status and changes in a dentist’s method
of remuneration.
Our regression models utilise a binary variable as dependent variable;
x-ray indicates whether a small dental x-ray (a ‘dental film’) was provided
during treatment, irrespective of any accompanying treatments. In the sam-
ple such an x-ray occurs in 19.3 per cent of treatments (see Table 2 for
summary statistics). The identification of the impact of financial incentives
relies on dentists who change their remuneration status, and because we al-
low the impact to vary with patients’ exemption, on patients who switch
exemption status. The first column in Table 1 summarises the extent of the
movement between payment and remuneration categories.
Patient characteristics are controlled for by the variable Patient age
and a variable for deprivation category Deprivation which is measured on a
scale from 1 (most aﬄuent) to 7 (least aﬄuent). This refers to the postcode
of the dental practice but the assumption that most patients utilize dental
care where they live allows this variable to be applied as a proxy for patients’
deprivation. We also control for Dentist age (on average, dentists are 41
years old), the Claims per day issued per dentist, and in the OLS mod-
els for the time period during which treatment claims were issued (variable
Financial year, see Table 2)10.
10In models with fixed effects, this covariate is dropped because of perfect collinearity
with dentist’s/patient’s age.
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To capture the potential effect of a patient changing their dentist we con-
struct a number of variables to distinguish between whether a patient who
is seeing the dentist for the first time is, or is not, exempt from treatment
charges and whether they are visiting a salaried or a fee-for-service dentist.
The summary statistics for the resulting dummy variables are described in
Table 2 with the prefix New patient:. Finally, Months’ since last visit
is included in order to assess whether the coefficients of interest are affected
by the duration of time that has elapsed since the patient’s last visit. By
inclusion of this variable we control for potential effects due to a cumulated
treatment needs over time. The inclusion of the two aforementioned cate-
gories of control variables (new patient; time since last visit) results in further
loss of observations because there is no information regarding duration since
last visit or which dentist was attended the last time for a patient’s first
appearance in the panel.
3.3 Estimation strategy
We seek to establish the effect of financial arrangements on the incidence
of x-rays, when these arrangements are not assigned randomly but are poten-
tially the consequence of choices made by dentists and patients that might
be influenced by the need of the patient for an x-ray. There is the usual
endogeneity problem associated with selection, wherein the estimated effect
of a change in remuneration might be a reflection of a change in the patient’s
health status and hence the need for an x-ray. Two standard approaches
to this issue are the use of changes in remuneration and payment status for
given individuals and instrumental variables. The use of instrumental vari-
ables implies well-known untested exclusion restrictions and is not readily
implementable in the setting we study where we do not have any obvious in-
struments for remuneration status. We therefore follow the former approach
and exploit the quasi-panel nature of the data with repeated observations on
both dentists and patients to establish the effect of a change in a given den-
tist’s remuneration subject to a given patient’s exemption status. We thus
take account of any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across both pa-
tients and dentists. We do this using both patient and dentist fixed effects.
Selection endogeneity bias could still prevail if there are time varying
factors that cause patients and dentists to select into a financial arrangement.
Overall, the chronic nature of oral diseases on the one hand and the fact that
treatment skills of dentists have been acquired throughout several years of
13
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dental education would seem to argue against frequent time varying effects,
but we cannot test for these. For patients they might arise if, when they
discover the need of an x-ray, the patient switches to a dentist that they
infer is more likely to give them an x-ray. The usual assumed asymmetry of
information between physician and patient argues against this mechanism,
but we further take account of this possibility by controlling for when a
patient is newly arrived at a dentist, and refine that further by allowing for
the interaction of new arrival and financial arrangements. For dentists, the
selection mechanism might imply that upon learning some new information
that leads them to wish to engage in more x-rays they choose to switch the
contract they are paid under. This is analogous to decision makers who
are subject to changing preferences and there is no means by which we can
control for unobserved variation in the motivation of individuals. We share
this limitation with any study based on observational data in which there is
limited information that might proxy for preferences. There are, however,
two mitigating factors. First we include the dentist’s age as a time varying
characteristic, so that if new information is monotonic in age this will control
for its arrival and second we note that in the health system we study dentists
cannot easily switch remuneration status. Once employed, a dentist has to
give notice and then set themselves up as a self-employed practitioner. If they
are currently self-employed a dentist wishing to change remuneration status
has to find an employment slot and these have traditionally been limited.
Our dependent variable is binary and thus gives rise to the possibility of
using non-linear regression models. However we utilise a linear probability
framework for reasons of computational speed (given the large dimensionality
of fixed effects), for ease of interpretation of marginal effects and for ease of
reporting a nested set of models across which to compare results. Since we
are not concerned with forecasting probabilities of x-rays the issue of out-
of-range estimates for these is not a problem and whilst the linear model
can exhibit bias and inconsistency this has been shown to be limited when
the probabilities that fall outside the unit interval are small (Horrace and
Oaxaca, 2006) which is the case in our model. To address the problem that
linear estimation imposes heteroskedasticity in the case of a binary response
variable we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard error estimates.
The general form of our regressions is:
(10) yijk = µ+ φij + βwijk + γxijk + ǫijk,
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where yijk is an indicator of an x-ray provided by dentist j to patient i
during course of treatment k; wijk is a vector of dummy variables indicating
the combination of patient i’s payment status (exempt or not) and dentist
j’s remuneration status during treatment k; xijk is a vector of additional
controls that vary across dentists, patients and their treatment courses; µ is
a constant;ǫijk is an error term and φij is given by
νj for patient-specific effects;
ηi for dentist-specific effects.
νj + ηi for patient & dentist-specific effects.
The estimated parameters of primary interest, contained in the vector
β, enable us to recover the effect of a dentist’s financial incentives and pa-
tients exemption status as the theoretical framework suggests it might. All
estimations were carried out using STATA/SE 12.0 (StataCorp, College Sta-
tion,Texas, USA). Estimation of fixed effects models was implemented via
the commands xtreg and felsdvreg. A conservative approach was used for
statistical inference so that the largest standard errors were chosen amongst
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered standard errors (Angrist and Pischke,
2009). Clustered standard errors were clustered on the patient-level (patient
fixed-effects models), the dentist-level (dentist fixed-effects models), and the
patient/dentist-level (OLS and two-way fixed-effects models), respectively.
4 Results
Our primary regression results are set out in Table 3 and we focus on the
role of dentist reimbursement and its interaction with a patient’s exemption
status. All regressions include the control variables discussed in Section 3
and described in Table 2. The omitted reference category is a non-exempt
patient treated by a salaried dentist, which our theoretical model suggests
will be the category with the lowest incidence of x-rays.
We report results for OLS and separately for patient and dentist fixed
effects and combined patient and dentist fixed effects. Columns F3 and
F4 differ in the inclusion in the latter of the New patient variables. The
coefficients of interest and their estimated standard errors vary across the
15
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different specification of fixed effects (columns F1 to F4 in the table). In
regard to model selection the F -statistics in columns F3 and F4 indicate
that patient and dentist fixed effects are separately and jointly significant
so that there is the potential for bias in models that omit one or other
category of fixed effects. The New patient variables are mostly significant
(the coefficients are reported in Table 5) and so their omission will cause
potential bias and we therefore focus on the coefficient estimates in column
F4. As indicated by R2 values the various models’ explanation of variation
in x-rays ranges from 4% in OLS to 25% in the most general fixed effects
model.
Using column F4 in the table it can be seen that the financial status of
the patient and the dentist’s remuneration significantly affect the probability
of an x-ray, in the direction predicted by our model. Interactions between
dentists who receive a separate fee for an x-ray (analogous to T in the model)
and patients who are exempt from charges (p = 0 in our model) exhibit a
9.4 percentage point increase in the probability of an x-ray during treatment,
relative to interactions between a salaried dentist and a non-exempt patient.
The separate effects of a dentist’s and their patient’s financial arrangements
can be inferred from the regression estimates as follows. For a salaried dentist
the consequence of a patient changing to exempt from non-exempt is 2.6
percentage points (the difference between the estimated coefficients in the
first and fourth rows of column F4). For a fee-for-service dentist the same
change increases the probability of an x-ray by 3.4 percentage points (the
difference between the second and third rows). For an exempt patient, their
dentist changing from salary to fee-for-service increases the probability of an
x-ray by 6.8 percentage points (the difference between the second and fourth
rows) whilst for a non-exempt patient the same change implies a 6 percentage
point increase. These changes can be related to the mean incidence of x-rays
in treatments which from Table 2 is 19.3%. Hence, we find strong evidence
of statistically significant and substantial impacts of financial incentives on
the incidence of x-rays – impacts that the imperative of “doing no harm”
suggests should not exist.
To check the robustness of our findings we report in Table 4 a number of
variants of the model reported in column F4. In the first column (R1) we drop
those treatments for which there is good evidence that an x-ray would in any
case be required. We cannot identify the precise condition of patients from
administrative records but by focusing on some procedures it is possible to
determine proxies for conditions for which an x-ray would usually be required.
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We do this for endodontic treatments which include root-canal fillings and
where x-rays are used to establish the exact nature of the required procedure.
Whilst the coefficient estimates change slightly when these treatments are
dropped their pattern and magnitude remains the same. If it were the case
that salaried dentists were skimping on necessary x-rays we might expect to
see some substantial differences between the estimates in columns F4 and
R1, but we do not. In column R2 we consider substantially restricting the
sample of treatments to only those where patients have had at least ten
courses of treatment over the study period. We expect such patients to be
subject to a lower probability of an x-ray in any one treatment since they will
likely have had x-rays over the course of their numerous interactions. Whilst
the magnitude of financial effects is now much smaller and not everywhere
significant there remains a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability of
an x-ray for an exempt patient treated by a fee-for-service dentist (relative
to a non-exempt patient, treated by a salaried dentist). Regular dental care
use therefore mutes the role of financial incentives but it does not eliminate
it. In column R3 we simplify the model and include only the patient’s and
dentist’s financial arrangements, not their interaction. This is a check that
the interaction effects are consistent with a simpler, if misspecified model and
provides an easier way of expressing the impact of incentives. The coefficient
estimates indicates that a dentist switching to fee-for-service from salary
status increases the probability of an x-ray by 6.3 percentage points. A switch
by a patient from non-exempt status to exemption increases the probability of
an x-ray by 3.4 percentage points. Finally in column R4 we report the results
of a placebo test of our model. The theoretical framework does not give any
cause to expect an anticipation effect of a dentist changing remuneration.
We therefore replace the dentist’s current remuneration status with their
future remuneration status (reflected in how they are paid in 100 courses of
treatment in advance of the current treatment). As expected we find a zero
impact of this future remuneration status.
The preferred model includes a number of control variables which whilst
not the focus of our study provide evidence of the drivers of dental x-rays.
We therefore report the full regression results for the model F4 in Table 5.
Significant effects are indicated for the dentist’s age (increases the probability
of an x-ray) and the patient’s age (decreases the probability of an x-ray).
In many studies of medical care, deprivation increases need and utilisation
but we do not find any evidence of this for dental x-rays. The controls
for a patient arriving newly at a dentist are mostly significant and positive
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suggesting that newly arrived patients have between 2.3 and 10.2 percentage
points increase in the probability of receiving an x-ray, with the exception of
exempt patients newly arrived at a salaried dentist (zero effect).
Thus overall the results indicate a number of significant and quantita-
tively large effects on the incidence of x-rays of a dentist’s remuneration in
combination with the patient’s exemption status. The former effects are sug-
gested directly by our theoretical framework; whether a dentist who has a
financial incentive to deliver an x-ray actually does so depends on whether
the patient who they are treating is exempt (or not) from contributing to
the cost of that x-ray because the effort required to persuade the patient is
lower in the former case.
5 Discussion
Accounting for treatment variation is a longstanding and ongoing concern
in healthcare. Economics suggests that the remuneration of the physician can
have an effect, but disentangling that is challenging on account of confound-
ing factors including the changing payment status of patients. Our findings
constitute a new perspective for the literature on the impact of financial
incentives in health care because we have focused on a potentially harmful
treatment and we have explicitly considered the role of a patient’s exemption
status on their dentist’s incentives to provide x-rays under different remu-
neration methods.
Dental x-rays are an important element of treatment because whilst ben-
eficial to diagnosis there are well-documented and potentially severe health
implications of ionising radiation. The data we have utilised track both the
dentist and their patient over time and thus provide a unique opportunity
to identify the impact of financial incentives whilst accounting for unob-
served heterogeneity on the part of both patient and dentist. The conceptual
framework for understanding this form of match-specific effect in determin-
ing treatment has been set out by others but we have adapted and extended
that framework to the particular setting of our study.
Submitting more than 1 million courses of treatment to fixed effects re-
gression analysis we are able to conclude that; simultaneously accounting for
heterogeneity specific to both patient and provider is important; that the
impact of a dentist’s financial incentives and a patient’s financial incentives
interact; that x-ray use increases substantially and significantly when den-
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tists are paid fee-for service and that x-ray use increases substantially and
significantly when patients switch dentists in some particular circumstances.
Overall our results confirm the role and importance of physician financial
incentives in contributing to variation in health care treatment because in the
system we have studied there are variations in provider remuneration, which
if eliminated would reduce the variation in the incidence of x-rays. Thus,
our results have a bearing on health care policy. We conclude that allowing
variation in provider remuneration contributes to potentially harmful varia-
tion in treatment and that both provider remuneration and patient financial
incentives have important roles to play in mitigating this potential harm.
As with any natural experiment our results are potentially affected by
selection. The relevant treatment effects therefore need to be considered
with care. As is standard in a fixed effects framework our estimates relate
to those individuals for whom the relevant variation occurs. The impact of a
dentist’s remuneration is estimated using the small number of dentists who
switch between salaried and fee-for-service remuneration. If dentists select
into the role of switching remuneration as a consequence of a predisposition
to respond more strongly to financial incentives than their non-switching
counterparts, then our results provide an estimate of the effect of abolishing
fee-for-service only on those specific dentists, who represent about 13 % of all
dentists in our sample. The policy intervention that our results predict the
effect of in this case is mandating that any dentist who is salaried cannot be
retained on a fee-for-service contract. More generally, however, the nature
of the potential harm caused by x-rays, the fact that risks increase linearly
with usage (there is no safe threshold) and the ubiquity of fee-for-service
arrangements for dentistry make our results of potential interest and concern
worldwide.
The case we have studied also highlights the difficulty in establishing
what might be an appropriate incentive structure in health care. First, our
results suggest that the supply-side and demand-side of the market cannot
safely be treated separately. But perhaps more fundamentally by considering
a treatment that can be harmful we highlight the difficult ethical challenges
in designing incentives. From an ethical perspective it may be particularly
challenging that patients with similar characteristics receive significantly dif-
ferent amounts of dental x-rays when this is caused by different methods
of provider payment. For a patient, the risk-benefit ratio of dental x-raying
should be independent of provider’s financial incentives. Even if patients may
voluntarily opt to receive a lower level of x-raying than would be optimal from
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a risk-benefit perspective, it nevertheless seems ethically questionable that
the amount of x-rays received by patients who are exempt from treatment
charges is significantly higher if the provider is paid fee-for-service than if
(s)he is paid salary. This either means that patients treated by salaried den-
tists receive less x-rays than optimal for their oral health or that exempt
patients treated by fee-for-service dentists receive too many x-rays.
Our findings suggest that financial incentives have a substantial impact
on dental x-raying. Given that we identify significant interaction effects
between provider payment and patient exemption, any policy intervention
which addresses either alone will not hit its intended target. This interaction
of incentives and their empirical magnitude is thus of importance for those
who want to ensure an adequate use of x-rays and limit their harmful side-
effects. Future research is encouraged to analyse the differential impacts
of dentist remuneration and patient co-payment status on the utilization
of various specific types of treatment such as tooth extractions, restorative
treatment, and preventive care. Given the specific characteristics of these
various components alongside the dental care continuum and their potentially
differential implications for patients and dentists, the impact of financial
incentives might differ between different treatment modalities.
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Table 1: Movers and Switchers
Patients — non-exempt to exempt 27,631
Patients — exempt to non-exempt 35,197
Patients — from fee-for-service to salaried dentist 8224
Patients — from salaried to fee-for-service dentist 6225
Dentists — from fee-for-service to salaried 291
Dentists — from salaried to fee-for-service 216
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
N
x-ray Equals 1 if “small x-
ray” was claimed
19.3 % 1,294,012
Deprivation Deprivation category of
dentist’s practice
1,294,012
1 (most aﬄuent) 6.0 % 1,294,012
2 14.3 % 1,294,012
3 19.6 % 1,294,012
4 28.5 % 1,294,012
5 16.1 % 1,294,012
6 9.4 % 1,294,012
7 (least aﬄuent) 6.1 % 1,294,012
Patient age Patient’s age in years 43.841 14.578 1,294,012
Months since last visit Duration since last visit
(months)
8.545 9.331 1,095,993
Claims per day Number of claims per
dentist
0.348 0.219 1,294,012
per day (5% random
sample)
Dentist age Dentist’s age in years 41.172 9.804 1,294,012
Salaried dentist treating
non-exempt patient
Equals 1 if patient
is non-exempt from
charges and dentist is
salaried
2.0 % 1,294,012
Salaried dentist treating
exempt patient
Equals 1 if patient is ex-
empt from charges and
dentist is salaried
0.9 % 1,294,012
Continued on next page...
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... table 2 continued
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
N
Fee-for-service dentist
treating non-exempt
patient
Equals 1 if patient
is non-exempt from
charges and dentist is
fee-for-service
71.0 % 1,294,012
Fee-for-service dentist
treating exempt patient
Equals 1 if patient is ex-
empt from charges and
dentist is fee-for-service
26.1 % 1,294,012
Financial year time period during
which claim was issued
1,294,012
year 1 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 2 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 3 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 4 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 5 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 6 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 7 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 8 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 9 10.0 % 1,294,012
year 10 10.0 % 1,294,012
New patient: NS Equals 1 if patient non-
exempt from treatment
0.8 % 1,093,686
charges switched to
salaried dentist
New patient: ES Equals 1 if patient ex-
empt from treatment
0.4 % 1,093,686
charges switched to
salaried dentist
New patient: NF Equals 1 if patient non-
exempt from treatment
12.5 % 1,093,686
charges switched to fee-
for-service dentist
Continued on next page...
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... table 2 continued
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
N
New patient: EF Equals 1 if patient ex-
empt from treatment
5.8 % 1,093,686
charges switched to fee-
for-service dentist
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Table 3: Main results
OLS Fixed Effects Models
[F1] [F2] [F3] [F4]
Salaried dentist treating (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
non-exempt patient
Fee-for-service dentist 0.083∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
treating exempt patient (0.003) (0.006) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
Fee-for-service dentist 0.061∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
treating non-exempt patient (0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
Salaried dentist -0.038∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.009 0.008 0.026∗∗
treating exempt patient (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
Patient fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes
Dentist fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for new patient No Yes
F -statistic (patients) - 1.69∗∗∗ - 1.48∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗
F -statistic (dentists) - - 16.88∗∗∗ 6.45∗∗∗ 6.32∗∗∗
F -statistic (combined) - - - 1.82∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗
R2 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.25
N (claims) 1,093,355 1,088,829
N (patients) 146,205 145,549
N (dentists) 3,081 3,063
All models control for dentist age and number of claims issued per month, patient age, deprivation
category and duration since last visit. ∗ denotes p < 0.10 ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ denotes
p < 0.01; clustered standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on patient-level in patient-
fixed-effect-model, dentist-level in dentist-fixed-effects-model and patient/dentist-level in OLS and
two-way-fixed-effects models)
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Table 4: Robustness results
[R1] [R2] [R3] [R4]
Salaried dentist treating (ref) (ref) - -
non-exempt patient
Fee-for-service dentist 0.092∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ - -
treating exempt patient (0.023) (0.016) - -
Fee-for-service dentist 0.058∗∗∗ 0.006 - -
treating non-exempt patient (0.013) (0.016) - -
Salaried dentist 0.028∗∗ -0.001 - -
treating exempt patient (0.012) (0.016) - -
Salaried dentist - - (ref) (ref)
Fee-for-service dentist - - 0.063∗∗∗ -0.007
- - (0.012) (0.009)
Non-exempt patient - - (ref) (ref)
Exempt patient - - 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
- - (0.002) (0.002)
Patient fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dentist fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for new patient Yes Yes Yes Yes
F -statistic (patients) 1.446∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗
F -statistic (dentists) 6.36∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 6.32∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗
F -statistic (combined) 1.79∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗
R2 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.25
N (claims) 1,056,633 756,900 1,088,829 867,169
N (patients) 145,805 756,900 145,549 131,787
N (dentists) 2,971 2,974 3,063 2,109
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In [R1] the sample restricted to treatment courses without endodontic treatment; [R2] sample
restricted to patients with at least ten treatment courses throughout the ten years observation
period; [R3] interacted variables for dentist reimbursement status and patient co-payment status
replaced by variables detecting the non-interacted effects of reimbursement status and patient co-
payment; [R4] placebo test: variable for dentists reimbursement status (fee-for-service vs. salary)
modified such that it represents the dentist’s reimbursement status 100 subsequent claims later for
the same dentist (in the sense of a lead variable). All models control for provider age and number of
claims issued per month, patient age, deprivation category and duration since last visit; denotes ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; clustered standard errors in parentheses (clustered on: patient-
level in patient-fixed-effect-model; dentist-level in dentist-fixed-effects-model; patient/dentist-level
in OLS and two-way-fixed-effects models).
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Table 5: Full results for model F4
Fixed Effects Model F4
Salaried dentist treating (ref) (ref)
non-exempt patient
Fee-for-service dentist 0.094∗∗∗ (0.012)
treating exempt patient
Fee-for-service dentist 0.060∗∗∗ (0.012)
treating non-exempt patient
Salaried dentist 0.026∗∗ (0.011)
treating exempt patient
Dentist age 0.006∗∗∗ (< 0.01)
Patient age -0.008∗∗∗ (< 0.01)
Deprivation category
...1 (ref) (ref)
...2 -0.002 (0.009)
...4 0.021∗∗ (0.009)
...4 0.012 (0.009)
...5 0.006 (0.009)
...6 0.018∗ (0.010)
...7 -0.008 (0.012)
Number of claims per month -0.0004∗∗∗ (< 0.01)
Days since last visit 0.004∗∗∗ (< 0.01)
New patient ES -0.004 (0.010)
New patient NS 0.023∗∗∗ (0.008)
New patient EF 0.080∗∗∗ (0.002)
New patient NF 0.102∗∗∗ (0.002)
R2 0.25
N (claims) 1,088,829
N (patients) 145549
N (dentists) 3063
∗ denotes p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; clustered standard errors (patient/dentist-level) in
parentheses.
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